This is a discussion on Security Experts, help, what is this (bad stuff)? within the Linux Security forums, part of the System Security and Security Related category; Michael Heiming wrote: > > Sounds great + noble! Would be interesting to know, how many of > them are happily ...
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Michael Heiming wrote:
> > Sounds great + noble! Would be interesting to know, how many of > them are happily used with Linux on them and which percentage > will be wiped and installed with some illegal doze copy? > > What kind of distro do you install? What about support, do those > people get rootly powers or any other help? What about updates, > presuming most people will connect them to the internet? > The computers are all 400 to 800 MHz Pentium with 256Meg of RAM plus CD, Nic, Hard drive, and Monitor etc. The company has upgraded to new Dells with LCD displays and 3 GHz processors. It must be nice to have way too much money. Most of the machines are only used for email, browsing, and word processing. The old machines were okay for that. I imagine that most of the machine will stay Linux as most of the people who will get the systems a) are not technical, b) not wealthy, c) pretty honest. I will either use Fedora Core 3 or Ubuntu 5.04. Both of these have a pretty good update facility. I haven't decided yet on "rootly powers", as for other help I will set them up with sshd+key so I can login and help if people want me to. I will also put a web page together to help the group and a BBS/Wiki. I don't plan on putting a whole lot of stuff on the systems, just a basic desktop, browser, email, OpenOffice, a couple of games and that is it. No servers other than sshd and that with private key access only for me. All of the systems will have iptables set up with almost nothing open. I hope some of the people will enjoy the systems enough to become Linux disciples and maybe even learn a little bit about computers and programming; but that may be asking way too much. |
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Ohmster <notareal@emailaddress.com> wrote:
> Appreciate the actual, helpful advice and that you did not give me the > "get it off the net, NOW" advice with little or nothing else to > actually address the issues at hand. Ohmster, there's a reason why advice _starts_ with "Get it off the Net, NOW:" Your very first and most important task simply has to be to reassert control over any root-compromised machine. Until you do that, you don't know what the machine is really doing and what it's about to do. It may be committing criminal acts in your name. It may be sending out your business data to unknown third parties. It may be about to execute a planned auto-erase of all your hard drives. Thus, the standard first step that is _always_ recommended is to reassert control by bringing the machine down immediately -- I would even (normally) just cut the power -- and only then taking other recovery and rebuilding steps. It's admittedly painful to deal with the resulting downtime, while you construct a substitute box, but you may be averting a _lot_ worse things by so doing. I'm sorry it's unpalateable advice, but we're honestly not kidding, and have excellent reasons for making the recommendation -- and (speaking for myself) follow it, ourselves. Don't kid yourself into thinking this matters only to sysadmins: If you're running network daemons on the Internet, you're a sysadmin. Congratulations. Now, don't screw up. ;-> -- Cheers, Rick Moen "vi is my shepherd; I shall not font." rick@linuxmafia.com -- Psalm 0.1 beta |
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Bev A. Kupf <bevakupf@myhome.net> wrote:
> If you aren't running mission critical services, then be less > recalcitrant to pull the plug. I think that Rick Moen wrote a really > nice article in response to your post, describing his own experience, > and how long it took him to get back online. Keeping in mind > that Rick is an expert on Linux security, I think his approach > is worth giving serious consideration to. Thanks for the kind words. I'm not an expert on Linux security, though, just a sysadmin who considers security interesting. Just to clarify, that "22 hours" of elapsed time, from the moment AIDE informed me the system had been rooted (via an awstats CGI exploit I'd carelessly left exposed) until rebuild was complete and services restored, _did_ include six hours of sleep and a full work day elsewhere. System rebuild probably ate about 6-7 hours of my life. The 22 hour figure -- system downtime -- is what the _users_ would care about, since they don't give a damn if you eat or earn a salary. ;-> |
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Rick Moen <rick@linuxmafia.com> wrote in news:64707$42774313$c690c3ba$788
@TSOFT.COM: > Ohmster, there's a reason why advice _starts_ with "Get it off the Net, > NOW:" Your very first and most important task simply has to be to > reassert control over any root-compromised machine. Until you do that, > you don't know what the machine is really doing and what it's about to > do. It may be committing criminal acts in your name. It may be sending > out your business data to unknown third parties. > > It may be about to execute a planned auto-erase of all your hard drives. > > Thus, the standard first step that is _always_ recommended is to > reassert control by bringing the machine down immediately -- I would > even (normally) just cut the power -- and only then taking other > recovery and rebuilding steps. > > It's admittedly painful to deal with the resulting downtime, while you > construct a substitute box, but you may be averting a _lot_ worse things > by so doing. I'm sorry it's unpalateable advice, but we're honestly not > kidding, and have excellent reasons for making the recommendation -- and > (speaking for myself) follow it, ourselves. > > Don't kid yourself into thinking this matters only to sysadmins: If > you're running network daemons on the Internet, you're a sysadmin. > Congratulations. Now, don't screw up. ;-> Agreed. You all were right, maybe you did not have the evidence to show it at the time, but I looked and I looked and gosh darn it, you were all right. Looks like I got nailed with either the phpbb or awstats hack, either one or both, but I had both doors open and I got hit. Bastards were running stupid stuff in /var/tmp, all as user apache. Thank God that apache did not run with root access. They got a virus in, could not run it at root though. They got tons of spam through, because apache could indeed mail. Intersting, sucks, but really interesting. Will do much better with FC3, emphasis on security this time and no stupid stuff like awstats or phpbb unless they could be deemed "safe". At the time that I installed phpbb and awstats, they were considered safe, but the baddies got in and the exploit was found later. Do you think that awstats or phpbb could ever be truly considered "safe" to install and run, even though these exploits have been found and patched out of the programs? I like awstats and I like phpbb but if that means I am open to another hack attack, then no dice. -- ~Ohmster ohmster at newsguy dot com |
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On Wed, 04 May 2005 02:05:37 GMT,
Ohmster (notareal@emailaddress.com) wrote: > At > the time that I installed phpbb and awstats, they were considered safe, > but the baddies got in and the exploit was found later. Most often the "baddies" are script kiddies. I don't know how old the phpbb and awstats exploits are, but the odds are high that they weren't first discovered on your system, i.e. the baddies most likely got in _after_ the exploit was known, rather than discover it first on your system. -- Many a smale maketh a grate -- Geoffrey Chaucer |
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Ohmster <notareal@emailaddress.com> wrote:
> Agreed. You all were right, maybe you did not have the evidence to show > it at the time, but I looked and I looked and gosh darn it, you were all > right. Dammit, I _hate_ it when that happens! ;-> > Looks like I got nailed with either the phpbb or awstats hack, > either one or both, but I had both doors open and I got hit. Honestly, by April 2005, RH9 had so many unfixed holes in it that it's pretty much academic. That's probably why most people here went so directly and forcefully to the "Get it off the Net" phase: We all thought, "Let's see, last updates for RH9 would have been April '04, so he's almost certainly been running a completely unmaintained distro for a full year. _With_ phpbb and CGIs? He's toast. Wipe and reinstall -- and it'd take a miracle to figure out which of the myriad likely vulnerbilities the kiddies used." Security is a somewhat difficult problem -- but (in many cases) figuring out the exact path by which a machine was compromised is _really_ difficult. Running a file-based IDS (aka integrity checker) such as AIDE, Integrit, Samhain, Tripwire, etc. makes it easier, because (if the baddies didn't just wipe out the IDS records) you can at least see what got changed. But you didn't have one of those. > Bastards were running stupid stuff in /var/tmp, all as user apache. > Thank God that apache did not run with root access. They got a virus > in, could not run it at root though. So, here's one more discomfiting question, to add to your existing pile: How do you _know_ the kiddies didn't get root? It's a tough and subtle question -- one that might equally be asked of any other Linux admin, at any time: What's the nature of your reason to believe that your system hasn't been cracked? We normally have mostly absence of evidence to draw upon: We look around for suspicious activity, fail to find any, and guess/conclude that (we think, we hope) nobody has compromised our system security. A properly set up, configured, and monitored file-based IDS adds to that picture an additional, slightly higher grade of justification for that belief: We then know that, as of the last IDS report, if we've succeeded in making it tamper-resistant and made it watch all the right things, a bunch of files we consider crucial haven't been fooled with. Further beyond that, you can check machine A from a second, nearby machine B, where a network IDS (nmap, snort, nessus...) watches machine A for suspicious network activity. Potentially, all of this paranoia could chew up too much of your time, so you script and automate where you can. Welcome to my profession. > Will do much better with FC3, emphasis on security this time and no > stupid stuff like awstats or phpbb unless they could be deemed "safe". At > the time that I installed phpbb and awstats, they were considered safe, > but the baddies got in and the exploit was found later. Do you think that > awstats or phpbb could ever be truly considered "safe" to install and > run, even though these exploits have been found and patched out of the > programs? Let's talk about those individually. awstats is the easy one: The fact that it posts system stats on a Web page isn't dangerous. What's dangerous is that it does so via a (not-well-designed-and-debugged) CGI. Programs that can be fed arbitrary data from the public need to be _very_ carefully written, taking great care to "sanitise" (validate) input data; otherwise, a canny member of the public can overload the input routines with deliberately malformed, and/or excessive data designed to overflow program structure and trigger a fault condition that the bad guys can exploit. Guess what? A CGI like awstats _does_ accept public input -- in the form of data passed to it from the URL. But awstats has proven to be buggy in its input handling. There's no reason why awstats _needs_ to run as a CGI in order to merely generate Web statistics. The obvious alternative would be to set it up as a cronjob, preventing crafty members of the public from attacking it from its URL input interface. Want to know how exactly to do that, with awstats? Well, sorry, I haven't yet had time to look into that. So far, I've merely deinstalled the thing, intending to look into the matter later. OK, that leaves the more-complex matter, that of developed PHP apps such as (in particular) phpBB. The phpBB codebase has had quite a string of problems, over the last couple of years. I also remember the development site's docs acknowledging for a while that, yeah, requiring you to have "register_globals = On" in php.ini was security-reckless, but you'll just have to live with that until they rewrite a bunch of their code. I vaguely recall that they eventually fixed that, but I was rather less than impressed. As to the bigger picture, of how you decide what PHP apps are sufficiently safe, and what php.ini configuration is acceptable, and how you fix (if at all) PHP things that break when you tighten php.ini more than they can cope with -- well, I wasn't kidding when I said I would be seeing if there were an article in this for me. When/if I write it, you'll have to read it mostly there (wherever "there" is), and not here. If you missed the list of URLs where you can read about / research PHP security issues, I've archived it and some other stuff, here: "PHP" on http://linuxmafia.com/kb/Security/ -- Cheers, "Heedless of grammar, they all cried 'It's him!'" Rick Moen -- R.H. Barham, _Misadventure at Margate_ rick@linuxmafia.com |
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Ohmster <notareal@emailaddress.com> wrote:
+--------------- | I have been having what I thought was a formmail exploit on my machine. | know that when I have these spam attacks, I have an unknown process | running and owned by apache that takes up 99% CPU. +--------------- Also look for CGI scripts with any of the following names, many of which showed up in a machine I help support which was attacked multiple times last year: af.cgi cgiemail/contact.txt cgiemail/feedback.txt contact.cgi contact.pl email.cgi email.pl ezformml.cgi feedback.cgi feedback.pl guestbook.pl fmail.pl form.cgi form.pl formmail formmail.pl FormMail.pl formmail2.pl mail.cgi mail.pl mailer/mailer.cgi mailform.pl npl_mailer.cgi sender.pl The "guestbook.pl" turned out to be particularly nasty, in that when it is accessed it gives a "CGI-Telnet" login screen!! [That's right, a !@&^%$@# web-based *shell*!!] -Rob ----- Rob Warnock <rpw3@rpw3.org> 627 26th Avenue <URL:http://rpw3.org/> San Mateo, CA 94403 (650)572-2607 |
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"Bev A. Kupf" <bevakupf@myhome.net> wrote in
news:slrnd7gg7k.mq4.bevakupf@myhome.net: > Most often the "baddies" are script kiddies. I don't know how old the > phpbb and awstats exploits are, but the odds are high that they weren't > first discovered on your system, i.e. the baddies most likely got in > _after_ the exploit was known, rather than discover it first on your > system. Thanks for all of your help, Bev. I have fedora core 3 up and running and did not install any stats or message boards. Will have to be very careful about that in the future. -- ~Ohmster ohmster at newsguy dot com |